Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while others claim no place within it at all. In fact, constructivism is sometimes defended as a normative theory about the justification of moral principles. Normative constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical or idealized process of rational deliberation.
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This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Thomson and G. Laslett and J. Sen and B. Google Scholar. CrossRef Google Scholar. In this paper, Rawls claims to eschew controversial philosophical and metaphysical claims and to defend his conception of justice as no more than a reasonable basis of agreement among members of a constitutional democracy. This claim which itself seems to make controversial philosophical assumptions runs counter to my metaphysical interpretation of Kantian constructivism and accords more closely with what I call the methodological interpretation.
First, Rawls concedes that his new paper may not be entirely consistent with his previous writings Finally whether or not Rawls intends the metaphysical interpretation of Kantian constructivism, his writings suggest it and others have so understood them.
Indeed, as I will now explain, his writings suggest an argument for constructivist anti-realism. For these reasons, it is worth exploring the metaphysical interpretation.
Daniels, ed. In fact, the model-conception of the well ordered society is not independent of the model-conception of the moral person; the former is heavily influenced by the latter.
The various features of the well-ordered society depend in important ways upon the Kantian ideal of persons as free, equal, rational, and socially co-operative 6, 20; —22, —7; See e. See, e. Actually, unlike the others, Dworkin embraces, rather than criticizes, the constructivist implications of the epistemological argument.
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Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures
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Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory
Constructivism in Metaethics